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A Persistent Danger:
Unexploded Ordnance in Populated Areas
The United Nations, the International Committee of the Red Cross, and the International Network on Explosive
Weapons have convincingly documented that the use of explosive weapons (especially those with wide area
effects) in populated areas (EWIPA) creates an unacceptably high risk of indiscriminate harm. As humanitarian
mine action organizations working in urban environments, we see this harm being done in numerous conflict
zones every day.
Discussion of the harm caused by EWIPA typically focuses on the immediate effects of these weapons when they
explode, as well as reverberating effects leading to displacement; damage to vital services such as healthcare,
water, and electricity; long-term psychological harm; and so on. But what of those weapons that, once launched,
do not explode? These items, known as unexploded ordnance (UXO), are an insidious threat that can afflict
civilians for generations. Any political declaration aiming to reduce the impact of EWIPA must therefore take UXO
into account.

What Gets Left Behind
Whenever a weapon is fired, dropped, launched, or
projected, there is always a chance it will not explode
and become an UXO. This chance (known as the “failure
rate”) is highest when a munition’s fuse fails due to
age, design flaws, or human error during the fusing
procedure. But the environment where a munition
is used is also a key factor. Failure rates provided by
arms manufacturers are typically based on a munition’s
performance in ideal conditions – which are far from the
reality of urban warfare.1 Indeed, a review by the United
States Army after the conflict with the Islamic State in
Iraq found that, “In Mosul, building construction (old
and new) within the city centre presented challenging
munitions survivability issues, mainly due to use of highpressure concrete, steel reinforcement, and multiple
stories; munitions survivability in terms of fusing and
body construction in some instances did not meet the
desired effect.” The research found that this “created a
follow-on force hazard of unexploded ordnance,”2 which
could be repurposed by other armed actors, cause harm
to civilians, and impede relief efforts.
During and after conflicts, UXO can be found all around
towns and cities: on roads, in school yards, surrounding
houses and hospitals, and in many other places where
people carry out their daily activities. The presence of
UXO can block access to food, water, and other basic
needs, and obstruct civilians’ access to education or
medical care. This contamination may drive people from
their homes, prevent the return of refugees and internally
displaced persons, and hamper the delivery of principled
humanitarian aid.
UXO are especially dangerous for those civilians –
particularly children – who do not recognize them as a
threat. External efforts to educate the population about
this danger may not always be effective, especially
when hostilities are ongoing and humanitarian access is
limited.
If left undiscovered or unaddressed, the threat posed
by UXO in populated areas can persist for years – and
even generations. UXO are still regularly found in urban
areas of Europe affected by the First and Second World

Wars. And as the materials used to create these weapons
degrade over time, the likelihood of accidental detonation
increases.
When UXO do explode, they can cause casualties and
serious damage to infrastructure. UXO with large explosive
payloads are especially devastating due to the large blast
or fragmentation radius they create. This harm is further
magnified in urban areas, where debris from surrounding
structures (such as metal, glass, and cement fragments) can
create a deadly wave of secondary fragmentation.

Clearance at Great Cost
UXO are cleared using a procedure known as battle
area clearance (BAC). When done in open areas, BAC is
relatively simple: Teams of deminers walking over an area
can readily detect ordnance, using visual inspection or
metal detectors, and remove it. Any UXO that are not safe
to move are destroyed where they are found. But when
UXO contaminate populated areas, BAC becomes far more
complex, time-consuming, and costly. And the risk that
UXO will not be found before causing casualties increases
significantly.
In populated areas, the built environment dramatically
increases the amount of area that must be searched
for UXO, with each floor of a building a potentially
contaminated area. Deep wells and drains where UXO
become lodged may require excavation. Structures that
were damaged by ordnance during conflict may have UXO
inside them, and must therefore be searched thoroughly.
Where the damage to such structures is significant, it
may not be safe to conduct clearance without enlisting
specialised engineers and armour-plated heavy machinery,
which is costly to purchase and operate. All too often, the
damage is so severe that demolishing the structure and
handing back a mound of cleared rubble to its owner is the
only safe option.
The lack of reliable strike data in many conflict areas
further complicates the BAC process. If such data is not
collected by armed actors, or not shared with mine action
organizations, then it will be impossible to guarantee that
areas are free from UXO without a complete inspection.

1. See, for example: International Committee of the Red Cross, “Weapon Contamination in Urban Settings: An ICRC Response,” July 2019; and
Jacqueline MacDonald and Carmen Mendez, “Unexploded Ordnance Cleanup Costs: Implications of Alternative Protocols,” RAND Corporation,
2005.
2. United States Army, “Mosul Study Group: What the Battle for Mosul Teaches the Force,” September 2017, P. 57. https://www.armyupress.
army.mil/Portals/7/Primer-on-Urban-Operation/Documents/Mosul-Public-Release1.pdf.

Sinjar: A City in Pieces
The city of Sinjar, in northern Iraq, was devastated
during conflict with the Islamic State in 2014.
Innumerable weapons with wide area effects were
deployed in the city, including 500 pound bombs, 120
mm mortars, conventional and improvised projectiles,
and anti-personnel mines of an improvised nature
– hundreds of which were left behind after conflict.3
Roughly 70 percent of the Sinjar’s housing stock was
destroyed,4 along with large parts of the city hospital,5
schools, the primary water tank,6 and government
buildings such as the local land registry. Nearly 67
percent of Sinjar’s road network was also rendered
unusable by the conflict.7 While some structures were
specifically targeted by the Islamic State (including
religious sites belonging to the Yazidi community),
the subsequent bombardment caused large-scale
destruction with reverberating effects. So much so that

more than five years after fighting stopped, and after more
than 2,200 hours of work by humanitarian mine action
agencies,8 much of the city remains uninhabitable and
thousands of residents have yet to return.

The complexity of BAC in urban areas makes the process
extremely costly. Indeed, mine action organizations
working in Iraq estimate that clearance of UXO in urban
settings is six times more expensive than similar work
done in rural areas.11
The time required to conduct urban UXO clearance, and

the limited resources available for it, further increases the
risk of civilian death, injury, and economic loss. Civilians
returning to an area before it is cleared may attempt to
dispose of UXO themselves, causing it to explode; or
accidentally detonate it during reconstruction or repairs.

“I was really sad when I saw our house totally
destroyed and turned into ruins. I felt lost and afraid
because my family and I hoped to find a sanctuary
after all we went through during displacement.” –
Aryan, Sinjar9
“When we first returned back home we realized that
everything was gone; that nothing was the same
as it used to be… Every square meter that I clear is
as important to me as clearing my own house and
property. I consider all of this city my land and all of
its people like my family.” – Jihan, Sinjar10

Recommendations
As members of the International Network on Explosive
Weapons (INEW), we believe that an international
political declaration on explosive weapons in populated
areas must commit states to:12
■■ Develop operational policies and procedures that will
stop the use of explosive weapons with wide area effects
in populated areas;
■■ Recognise

the rights of direct and indirect victims and
provide adequate assistance to their needs;
■■ Support

and undertake data gathering including data on
victims disaggregated by sex and age;
■■ Enable

humanitarian and protection measures;

■■ Build

a community of practice, including through regular
meetings to discuss the issue and progress towards
reducing harm; and
■■ Share

positive practice and experiences.

To reduce the effects of UXO in populated areas, we
further recommend that the political declaration commit
states to:
■■ Collect, retain, and share data on the use of explosive
weapons, and continually improve such data collection in
line with best practice. This includes:
–– Using battle damage assessments and other tools
that comprehensively record direct and indirect strikes,

including the date/location of the strike, the type/quantity
of munitions used, and any civilian casualties which may
have resulted
–– Employing tools that attempt to distinguish between
strike locations where ordnance has definitively exploded
and strike locations where UXO may be present (treating
all cluster munition strikes as potential UXO locations).
–– Consistently sharing such strike records with
national mine action authorities (or other responsible
agencies), the United Nations, and non-governmental
organisations, to facilitate rapid and efficient survey,
clearance, risk education, and assistance to survivors.
■■ Provide

comprehensive humanitarian assistance
(including mine action activities such as survey, clearance,
risk education, and victim assistance) in conflict-affected
areas; or provide all necessary assistance to United
Nations and non-governmental organizations with the
capacity to do so.
■■ Ensure

that victims – including injured persons,
survivors, family members of people killed and/or injured,
and communities damaged by conflict – receive adequate
assistance based on their needs in a non-discriminatory
manner. This should include emergency medical care,
physical rehabilitation, psychosocial support and socioeconomic inclusion, as well as support towards the full
realisation of survivors’ rights and their full participation in
society.

3 & 8. Mines Advisory Group operations database. Accessed 14 January 2020.
4. Government of Iraq and the World Bank Group, “Iraq Reconstruction and Investment, Part II: Damage and Needs Assessment of Affected
Governorates,” January 2018.
5. REACH Initiative, “Rapid Overview of Areas of Return (ROAR): Sinjar and Surrounding Areas,” May 2018.
6. Norwegian Refugee Council, “Multi Sector Rapid Needs Assessment of Sinjar Town,” May 2018.
7. Government of Iraq and the World Bank Group, op. cit.
9 & 10. Interviews with Mines Advisory Group, January 2020
11. Mines Advisory Group internal estimates. Available upon request.
12. For more information, see: International Network on Explosive Weapons, “A Declaration to Prevent Harm from the Use of Explosive Weapons
in Populated Areas,” September 2019.
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